Better authentication for socket.io (no query strings!)

Introduction

This post describes an authentication method for socket.io that sends the credentials in a message after connection, rather than including them in the query string as usually done. Note that the implementation is already packed in the socketio-auth module, so you should use that instead of the code below.

The reason to use this approach is that putting credentials in a query string is generally a bad security practice (see this, this and this), and though some of the frequent risks may not apply to the socket.io connection request, it should be avoided as there’s no general convention in treating urls as sensitive information. Ideally such data should travel on a header, but that doesn’t seem to be an option for socket.io, as not all of the transports it supports (WebSocket being one) allow sending headers.

Needless to say, all of this should be done over HTTPS, otherwise no security level is to be expected.

Implementation

In order to authenticate socket.io connections, most tutorials suggest to do something like:

io.set('authorization', function (handshakeData, callback) {
  var token = handshakeData.query.token;
  //will call callback(null, true) if authorized
  checkAuthToken(token, callback);
});

Or, with the middleware syntax introduced in socket.io 1.0:

io.use(function(socket, next) {
  var token = socket.request.query.token;
  checkAuthToken(token, function(err, authorized){
    if (err || !authorized) {
      next(new Error("not authorized"));
    }
    next();
  });
});

Then the client would connect to the server passing its credentials, which can be an authorization token, user and password or whatever value that can be used for authentication:

socket = io.connect('http://localhost', {
  query: "token=" + myAuthToken
});

The problem with this approach is that it credentials information in a query string, that is as part of an url. As mentioned, this is not a good idea since urls can be logged and cached and are not generally treated as sensitive information.

My workaround for this was to allow the clients to establish a connection, but force them to send an authentication message before they can actually start emitting and receiving data. Upon connection, the server marks the socket as not authenticated and adds a listener to an ‘authenticate’ event:

var io = require('socket.io').listen(app);

io.on('connection', function(socket){
  socket.auth = false;
  socket.on('authenticate', function(data){
    //check the auth data sent by the client
    checkAuthToken(data.token, function(err, success){
      if (!err && success){
        console.log("Authenticated socket ", socket.id);
        socket.auth = true;
      }
    });
  });

  setTimeout(function(){
    //If the socket didn't authenticate, disconnect it
    if (!socket.auth) {
      console.log("Disconnecting socket ", socket.id);
      socket.disconnect('unauthorized');
    }
  }, 1000);
}

A timeout is added to disconnect the client if it didn’t authenticate after a second. The client will emit it’s auth data to the ‘authenticate’ event right after connection:

var socket = io.connect('http://localhost');
socket.on('connect', function(){
  socket.emit('authenticate', {token: myAuthToken});
});

An extra step is required to prevent the client from receiving broadcast messages during that window where it’s connected but not authenticated. Doing that required fiddling a bit with the socket.io namespaces code; the socket is removed from the object that tracks the connections to the namespace:

var _ = require('underscore');
var io = require('socket.io').listen(app);

_.each(io.nsps, function(nsp){
  nsp.on('connect', function(socket){
    if (!socket.auth) {
      console.log("removing socket from", nsp.name)
      delete nsp.connected[socket.id];
    }
  });
});

Then, when the client does authenticate, we set it back as connected to those namespaces where it was connected:

socket.on('authenticate', function(data){
  //check the auth data sent by the client
  checkAuthToken(data.token, function(err, success){
    if (!err && success){
      console.log("Authenticated socket ", socket.id);
      socket.auth = true;

      _.each(io.nsps, function(nsp) {
        if(_.findWhere(nsp.sockets, {id: socket.id})) {
          console.log("restoring socket to", nsp.name);
          nsp.connected[socket.id] = socket;
        }
      });

    }
  });
});
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My take on RESTful authentication

The topic of authentication in REST architectures is a debatable one; there are several ways to do it, not all of them practical, not all RESTful; no standard and a lot of room for confusion. Ever since I got into REST, this was the one thing which wasn’t evident to me, even after a decent amount of research. Recently I got the time to dive deeper in the problem, evaluated thoroughly the alternatives and made my conclusions. While they may be inaccurate at some degree, I gather them here since I found no one place that would present the topic in a friendly fashion.

First let’s establish some ground rules for the analysis, to avoid a lot of the usual confusion.

  1. I want to authenticate my own clients: a Single-Page Web App or a Mobile App is the front end, and a REST API is the back end of my application. I don’t want to authenticate third-party consumers of my API, which is the focus of most REST traditional bibliography.
  2. I want to do pragmatic REST: I’m not interested in being too subtle on how much state is RESTful; I won’t start by quoting Fielding’s dissertation on why REST should be stateless. I know statelessness induces some desirable properties on the architecture, therefore it’s good to reduce the application state to the minimum and try to keep it on the client side. But, some compromises can be made to get other desirable properties, such as security, simplicity of the implementation, better user experience (i.e. no ugly Basic Auth browser dialog). For example, having a resource that matches an access token to a user, and states the expiry time, sounds like a fair trade-off between convenience, security and RESTfulness.
  3. You can’t get away without SSL/TLS. If you want to provide a decent level of security (and why else would you worry about authentication?), you need to have a secure channel of communication, so you have to use HTTPS.
  4. Using a home-brew authentication method is probably a bad idea.

That being said, let’s look at the authentication methods available.

HTTP Basic

Why would you use HTTP Basic authentication? well, it’s simple, and that always counts. It does send the password on each request, which in most cases isn’t that big of a deal since, as we established, we are over HTTPS. Most methods will make you send the credentials anyway, and although some of them do it in just one request, I don’t see this as a deal-breaker for the most common authentication method out there. The biggest issue with Basic (also applicable to digest) is that it displays an ugly browser login dialog, and you can’t avoid that just by including the authorization header manually via JavaScript, because it would appear in the case of invalid credentials. To get around this you have to incur in inconvenient hacks, moving away from the standard. Thus we loose the simplicity we started with, we get too close to the ill-fated place of rolling our own security method (without adding any desirable extra features), and so we should probably look into one of the other options.

HTTP Digest

Digest is intended to be a more secure alternative to HTTP Basic, and could be considered if we were not using HTTPS, which we are. Without a secure connection, the method is vulnerable to Man-in-the-Middle attacks, you’d be sending credentials hashed with a weak algorithm and you wouldn’t be allowed to use a strong encryption method to store the passwords. Moreover it’s less simple than Basic and you still have to deal with the browser login box. So we rule out digest.

Cookies

A classic resource on RESTful Authentication is the homonymous stackoverflow question. The most voted answer there mentions the problems of using Basic Auth and proposes a custom method based on storing a session id in a cookie. I don’t mind having a narrow scoped session (for example with expiration date), but if you’re rolling a custom method, I don’t see any advantages in using cookies over an Authorization Header, either mimicking Basic Auth or with a different logic.

OpenID

OpenID provides federated authentication by letting the user log in an application using his account from another provider such as Google or Yahoo. It is in theory a more adequate approach than OAuth for delegating the credentials management to a third-party provider, but it’s harder to implement and I haven’t found a single source discussing how it may be used as a method for REST authentication.

OAuth

OAuth is probably the biggest source of confusion: you have two widely deployed versions, with a lot of debate behind, and several workflows to handle different scenarios. What’s more, OAuth is an authorization standard, that in some cases may be bent into doing authentication.

Pseudo-authentication

The most common use case of OAuth is a user authorizing a consumer application to access his data on a third party application (i.e. Facebook), without giving away his credentials. This authorization schema can be used as a way of delegated authentication: if the consumer is granted access to the user data, then the identity of the user is proven. While this works, it has some pitfalls: first, it assumes that having access to user data equals to being the user, which isn’t necessarily true (this is not enforced by the protocol), but more importantly, it gives the consumer application access to data that shouldn’t be required for authentication (i.e. photos, contacts). That’s why this is referred as pseudo-authentication. It’s worth noting that OpenID Connect is being developed as a complement to OAuth to solve this problem.

2-legged and Client Credentials

There are cases where you want to handle credentials yourself, so you don’t need the third party provider in the workflow. Some articles suggest using OAuth1 2-legged Auth or the OAuth2 Client Credentials grant, but I’ve found that both of them solve the authorization part, providing an access token to include in the requests, but leave authentication (how you establish the identity when requesting for that token) to be handled by other method. Thus, it’s not of much use for the problem at hand.

Resource Password Owner

OAuth2 Resource Password Owner flow does solve authentication when you are in control of the credentials. It exchanges an initial request with user and password for a token that can be used to authenticate (and authorize) subsequent requests. This is an alternative to Basic Auth, slightly better in the sense that you just include credentials on the first call (thus you don’t need to store them in the client). It’s also a standard with a simple implementation and avoids the browser interaction problem of the standard HTTP methods, making it the better choice in this scenario.

Secure Remote Password

Meteor.js recently introduced the Secure Remote Password protocol as a way to handle authentication in web applications. It’s hailed as the one method that guarantees security without HTTPS, but SRP itself only provides a way to log a user in without using its credentials in the application server. Upon user registration, a verifier is stored instead of the password; for authentication the user sends some parameters derived from the password that can be checked against that verifier. The credentials indeed are never sent, and can’t be guessed by the parameters, but you still need a secure transaction when registering the verifier. An attacker that gets a hold of the verifier can obtain the passwords with a dictionary attack. An interesting case of this is the attack to Blizzard servers in 2012.

Conclusions

Avoiding password management is generally a good idea for application developers. With that in mind, I’d start looking at delegated and federated authentication for securing my RESTful APIs. OAuth is formally less appropriated, but simpler and more widely used than OpenID, which some state to be dead, so that looks like the safer bet. If you want to handle credentials yourself, OAuth’s Resource Password Owner flow is probably the best choice.